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COMMENTARY
Robert Z. Aliber*
It's a great pleasure to return to Brooklyn. More than thirty
years ago, I lived on Remsen Street, only a few blocks from here.
The changes in the street-side landscape in New York since the
early 1960s are striking. Then, the department stores in New
York included Abraham & Strauss, Stern's, Gimbel's, Saks,
Macy's, Ohrbach's, Korvettes, Masters, Hearns, Alexander's,
Wanamaker's, and Bloomingdale's; only a few of these names re-
main. Similarly, there were many more banks in the early 1960s:
there was Bank of Manhattan, which eventually merged with
Chase; Hanover National, which was acquired by Manufacturers
Trust; Corn Exchange, which became part of Chemical; Irving,
which was acquired by Bank of New York; and Franklin Na-
tional, which failed and was later acquired by European-Ameri-
can (initially a consortium and subsequently acquired by ABN-
AMRO).
The development of department stores in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries was partly a response to
demands for economic efficiency - there were significant sav-
ings from shopping for a large variety of different types of prod-
ucts under one roof, or what later would be called economies of
scope. Moreover, the identification of the department store with
family names was a guarantee of the quality of the goods; Mr.
Macy, Mr. Gimbel, and Mr. Marshall Fields were providing the
"Good Housekeeping" seal of approval to what were otherwise
generic products that were on the counters and the coat racks in
their stores, and thus were reducing the time that consumers
had to spend seeking assurances about the quality of goods. At
that time these stores were local, although Sears Roebuck had
developed on a national scale.
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The decline in the market share of the department stores
reflects both the suburbanization of America and the develop-
ment of brand names on a nationwide scale. The economies of
scope have become available in the mall and have supplanted
the scope economies inherent in the store. Similarly, the spe-
cialty stores carry the same nationally branded goods as the de-
partment stores; the increasing reliance on national brand names
has eroded the value of Mr. Macy's guarantee. The inventories
in the specialty stores generally are larger than those in the de-
partment stores. Now mega-discount chains like Walmart and
K-Mart are gaining a greater share of the market.
The market share of banks as a group in total financial
flows has declined, even as individual banks have consolidated.
The paradox is that United States banks are seeking to become
department stores of finance, even as the traditional department
stores appear to be fading.
The consolidation of banks is a result of two different phe-
nomena. One is the belief that there are economies of scale in
some elements of banks' production or marketing activities. The
second is that once an individual bank incurs exceptionally large
loan losses, so that its capital becomes depleted relative to a reg-
ulatory standard or benchmark, the interests of bank's share-
holders may be better enhanced if the bank is merged.
The prospective move towards universal banking in the
United States - essentially a department store of finance - re-
flects at least three different arguments. One is the view that
there are economies of scope - essentially economies for selling
several different financial products at the same time. A second is
that the universal banks in Germany are likely to become the
standard for the European Community. A third is that many
non-banks have acquired banks or have issued liabilities com-
petitive with those of banks, so that there are now regulatory
asymmetries. Thus, Merrill Lynch has its Cash Management Ac-
count (CMA), with $26 billion of deposits; Sears owns Allstat6
and Dean Witter and the Discover card. Citicorp has acquired
failed savings and loans in Washington, D.C., Florida, Chicago,
and San Francisco.
The purpose of this Conference is to examine the public
policy issues associated with the various proposals for relaxing
United States regulations so that United States banks might be-
come department stores of finance. As I listened to the various
papers earlier in the morning, I was reminded of the remark by
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Admiral Stockdale at the Vice-Presidential debate: "Why am I
here?" The papers are rich in detail about the legal arrange-
ments in Germany, France and Japan but, unfortunately, they
provide little insight on the public policy issues for an American
audience, largely because financial environments and bureau-
cratic traditions in these countries are very different from those
in the United States.
The European Community is about to adopt uniform bank-
ing regulations. We will probably hear that, as a result, the play-
ing field will become less level, and the United States will need
to adopt the German model of banking regulations. Consider the
advantages of a universal financial system - and it is useful to
make a distinction between outputs and inputs. First, what are
the outputs? Countries with universal banks appear to have
more stable financial systems; that's an output. The inference
made from this output is that the frequency of bank failure is
related to the size distribution of banks. Perhaps, but alterna-
tively, we might attribute this stability to the lack of shocks for
the financial system in Germany, as opposed to the structure of
banks. We might ask: "If the Bundesbank managed the Fed,
how many s&ls would have failed?" My answer: "Very few -
the failure of so many s&ls and banks reflects the sharp changes
in United States monetary policy, which led to sharp changes on
asset values, income and employment."
The second question is whether the universal bank provides
greater efficiency. This statement is somewhat remindful of the
question of why Swiss bankers are rich and the answer is: "They
compete with Swiss banks." The answer is an open question.
Now, we might look at this question in terms of the inputs.
If the two factors that I have noted before are correct, efficiency
and stability, what are the sources of the advantages? Are there
economies of scale? Are there economies of scope - the depart-
ment store analogy? In terms of a Coasian metaphor, are there
significant cost savings if transactions are internalized within the
firm, rather than compared with similar transactions that go
through the market? Are there significant advantages for univer-
sal banks in terms of either geographic or industrial diversifica-
tion? Do universal banks have a longer term view of the
problems of their clients?
Now, you may sense some skepticism about the universality
of institutions, and the usefulness of taking a model which has
been developed in one country and applying it to another coun-
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try, anticipating similar results. Baseball is the national pastime
in Japan, but it is not American baseball. Football in Canada
differs from United States football. Democracy has been ex-
ported to many countries; at least there are elections in these
countries, frequently with higher participation rates than in the
United States elections. But the large number of political pris-
oners in many of these countries suggests that their model of
democracy is very different from the United States model.
Even if an 'institution developed in one country could be
successfully applied to another country, there may be significant
costs in the change-over from one system to another. The Brit-
ish drive on one side of the road; we drive on another. They have
220 volts; we have 110 volts. There are economies from uniform-
ity - but is it worthwhile in terms of transaction costs to make
the change?
Consider the relevance of the foreign banking experience to
the United States and the question: "Why did these countries
develop universal banks?" Several papers allude to this ques-
tion, which involves the nature of the market for debt and, more
particularly, the market for equity. The countries which have
developed universal banks almost always have feeble bond and
equity markets - that is an association. But we might ask, "Do
countries have feeble bond and equity markets because they
have universal banks or do they have universal banks because
they have feeble bond and equity markets?" The plausible an-
swer is that the feebleness of the markets for bonds and equities
in many countries led to a void that was filled by the develop-
ment of universal banks.
Certain idiosyncratic features distinguish the United States
from other industrial countries. One is its massive geographic
size. A second is that the United States is very diverse ethni-
cally. Many countries appear to work well, in part because of
centralized management; many of these countries have a popula-
tion smaller than the greater Chicago area, and most of the pop-
ulation is blonde and blue-eyed. A third is that the United
States federal system is a part of our history which bears on the
locus of regulation. A fourth feature involves the skills and pres-
tige of United States regulators; traditionally the American bu-
reaucrats have not ranked high in terms of prestige compared
with bureaucrats in France, Japan, and Germany. Finally, the
United States approach toward the rule of law differs from that
of Japan or Great Britain, where gentlemen's agreements and
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understandings are an important part of the regulatory struc-
ture. What's not forbidden - explicitly forbidden - is more or
less permitted.
The studies on the banking systems in France, Germany,
and Japan are not especially relevant for the choices about the
appropriate United States public policy toward the expansion of
the role of banks. There is very little in these papers about the
economies of scale, the economies of scope, external and internal
transactions costs, or about deposit insurance. These country
studies are orthogonal to the United States policy choices.
Let me conclude with two notes. One of the central issues
for United States policymakers is the relationship between de-
posit insurance and universal banking. Deposit insurance has
gotten many well-deserved criticisms because it has led to abuse;
some banks may have taken on too much risk because of deposit
insurance. The benefits from deposit insurance, given the macro-
level financial mismanagement that we've had in the last fifteen
years, is that we have avoided another Great Depression. We
look at the costs of deposit insurance in terms of the Charles
Keatings and the Keating Five, and we neglect the stability of
income or the lack of variability because there have been no sig-
nificant bank runs.
Which leads toward my conclusion - why not let the mar-
ket decide the appropriate expansion of banks and the range of
their activities? Well, the first answer is that banking is different
from other industries. What's the public policy interest and
what do we really want to protect? The system is excessively
protected, largely because the response to each macro-crisis has
been to add one more layer of protection. Deposit insurance was
added to the lender of last resort which had been superimposed
on top of asset examination and portfolio regulation. Most of
these regulations were developed to protect the macro economy
from the failure of groups of banks. Some regulations were de-
veloped to protect individual investors from their ignorance; one
analogy is the Food and Drug Administration, and another is the
Consumers' Union.
A major concern is whether deposit insurance should be
available to a universal bank. My answer is no. Banks could then
choose between becoming a universal institution and giving up
deposit insurance or retaining deposit insurance. The second
question is whether banks that choose the deposit insurance op-
tion should be allowed to engage in commerce. My answer is no.
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The third question is whether non-insured banks should be al-
lowed to engage in commerce. On that one I punt; I don't have
an immediate answer, but my inclination is that there should be
no restraint. And the fourth is whether universal institutions
should be subject to reserve requirements. Part of the explana-
tion for disintermediation - and the declining role of banks -
is due to the taxation of banks in the form of reserve require-
ments. As a result, we've had end-runs around the banks in the
formation of the banks and money market funds.
It would be hard to predict household shopping patterns
thirty years from now; consumers' shopping patterns are likely
to evolve so as to minimize their time spent shopping and
amounts spent. Similarly, it would be hard to predict the pat-
tern of demand for financial services. Let's perform an
experiment.
